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Seeing the “Changing Nature of Work”  
through a Precarity Lens 
 





This article reviews the concept of precarity and offers critical reflections on its contribution to the 
study of contemporary labour and livelihoods. A stock-take of key and recent literature suggests 
that, despite conceptual ambiguity and overstretching, “thinking with precarity” continues to prove 
a valuable and worthwhile exercise – so long as that thinking is carefully articulated. This involves 
understanding precarity as: 1) rooted in concrete labour market experiences but also connected to 
broader anxieties over social and political life; 2) a process-focused concept rather than end-state 
descriptor; and 3) speaking to longer histories and wider geographies than its commonplace status 
as a residual term or category implies. The analytical advantages of thinking in such a way are 
illustrated through a critical analysis of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2019 on the 
“changing nature of work”, and in particular its handling of digital labour. 
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Taking on the rise of automation, the expansion of the global gig economy and debates about the 
future of social inclusion, the World Bank’s World Development Report 2019 (hereafter WDR19 
or Report) puts forward an encouraging and hopeful outlook on the “changing nature of work” 
(World Bank, 2019). With new technologies, it is argued, come new opportunities. What matters is 
that societies are able to adapt in order to take advantage of them. Through combinations of scaled-
up social protection, cognitive re-skilling and flexible labour regulation, a path forward is charted. 
At the forefront of the changing nature of work is the rise of digital labour within the so-called 
platform economy (Schmidt, 2017), which according to the WDR19 “brings economic opportunity 
to millions of people who do not live in industrialized countries or even industrial areas” (World 
Bank, 2019: 3). Generating both remote and location-based work opportunities, from crowdwork 
and online freelancing (Graham, Hjorth and Lehdonvirta, 2017) to domestic work and digital ride-
hailing (Hunt and Machingura, 2016; Pollio, 2019), digital labour has been described as a newly 
dominant “feature of the global economic landscape” that is drawing in growing numbers of 
individuals around the world (Langley and Leyshon, 2017: 30) – many of whom are incorporated 
through contingent arrangements and remunerated on a piece-rate (or “gig-by-gig”) basis. With 
significant expansions in the variety and extent of digital connectivity over the past decade or so, 
these “new” forms of work have become increasingly framed as a viable livelihood option for those 
at the hard edge of jobless growth, rapid urbanisation and the failed promises of industrial 
development (see Li, 2017). It has been estimated, for example, that within the next ten years 
between thirty and eighty million people in sub-Saharan Africa will be employed in digital labour 
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(BFA/Mastercard Foundation, 2019), helping to meet a spectacular shortfall in jobs for African 
workers by absorbing a “substantial segment of the total 2030 … labour force of 600 million” 
(BFA/Mastercard Foundation, 2019.: 33). 
There is what Pasquale (2016) calls a mainstream or “conventional narrative” surrounding the 
rise of digital labour, elements of which are central to the WDR19’s “notably optimistic” position 
on the future of work (Anner, Pons-Vignon and Rani, 2019: 3). In this view, platforms are praised 
for bringing jobs to the unemployed or struggling masses through flexible and autonomous work 
arrangements, helping people to “become their own boss” (Ravenelle, 2019) while simultaneously 
improving both the quality and competitiveness of the modern-day service industry via so-called 
disruptive technologies. Emphasis is placed on the ability of platforms to support and connect, 
constituting a kind of “liberation technology” that offers individual economic empowerment and 
“new paths to equality” through digital connection (Mann and Iazzolino, 2019: 1; Meagher, 2020: 
669). This has proven a powerful and influential framing, with developing countries encouraged by 
big business alongside various high-level international organisations to embrace the latest 
disruptive innovations and advances of capital (in addition to WDR19, see also: PWC, 2016; World 
Bank, 2016; International Panel on Social Progress, 2018; Bussolo et al., 2019; Choi, Dutz and 
Usman, 2019; Strusani and Houngbonon, 2020).  
But to what extent is this emancipatory narrative actually borne out by the concrete realities 
of digital labour? The central argument of this article is that when seen through a different lens, a 
rather less optimistic perspective on the changing nature of work emerges. In particular, it argues 
that “thinking with precarity”, as Anna Tsing (2015) has put it, opens up productive yet critical 
lines of enquiry into the study of people’s livelihoods as well as transformations in work and 
employment. Using a carefully calibrated “precarity lens” to approach and make sense of the lived 
experiences of digital workers reveals what the WDR19, with its overwhelming emphasis on the 
connective and generative capacities of new technology, obscures – and in doing so points us in 
the direction of a possible “counter-narrative” of digital labour.  
This argument is developed in three stages. The first section draws on key insights from the 
social sciences to outline a conceptualisation of precarity, with particular reference to research from 
the cognate fields of labour geography, economic sociology and the anthropology of work. Despite 
a few conceptual limits and hindrances, it is suggested that the concept of precarity adds analytical 
value to the study of contemporary labour and livelihoods in three core ways. Some time is spent 
fleshing these out. The second section illustrates the value of thinking carefully and critically with 
precarity through a critique of the WDR19 – and, in particular, of the claims and propositions it 
puts forward in relation to digital labour. A range of emerging empirical evidence from the Global 
South informs this analysis. The third and final section concludes by highlighting the need for a 
more restrained handling of the promise of “disruptive” technologies and greater engagement with 




Precarity has emerged as “a topic en vogue” in recent years (Prosser, 2016: 949), both as a 
description of global economic conditions since the beginning of the twenty-first century and a 
subject of burgeoning academic engagement. What exactly does it refer to?  
Broadly speaking, there are two main camps divided on the matter (Han, 2018; Kasmir, 2018; 
Neilson, 2019). On the one hand there are those, following the influential work of Judith Butler, 
who see precariousness as a generalised social malaise or condition of broader life, insofar as one’s 
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own circumstances are always to some degree dependent on the lives of others (Harker, 2012; 
Burridge and Gill, 2016). While all are thus bound by a shared condition of vulnerability and an 
absence of absolute stability, precarity in this reading is used to capture degrees of material 
difference: exposure to injury, violence and death is unevenly distributed throughout society and 
concentrated within particular social groups. This is precarity as an ontological category. 
On the other hand, a somewhat narrower idea of precarity is to be found, defined as a form 
of economic insecurity that is “contextually specific in contemporary times that emanates primarily 
from labour market experiences” (Waite, 2009, in Burridge and Gill, 2016: 26, emphasis added). In this 
usage, precarity is: understood first and foremost as the absence of stable employment; closely 
associated with particular forms of work, typically those which are increasingly characterised by 
casual, flexible, contingent and part-time arrangements (McDowell, Batnitzky and Dyer, 2009), as 
well as by disproportionate exposure to harm and risk;1 and commonly characterised as a deviation 
from the “standard employment relationship” (SER) that accompanied the rise of mid-twentieth-
century Fordism (seeFudge, 2017). 
Although research in this second camp has increasingly sought to unpack the ways in which 
the “processes that give rise to precarity” are always subject to “context specific variation” (Strauss, 
2018: 624), it has tended to do so within the context of the Global North, describing and analysing 
a shift over the past thirty years or so from stable, predictable and lifelong full-time jobs – that is, 
those associated with the SER – to short-term intermittent engagements with more variable wages 
(Pierce, Lawhon and McCreary, 2019). Dominant understandings of precarity have therefore been 
overwhelmingly informed by evidence from North American and European contexts (Lee and 
Kofman, 2012), and as a result closely bound to contemporary idioms of loss, withdrawal and 
dispossession (Allison, 2013, in Han, 2018: 336). In response, and in a similar way to those 
developing new geographies of urban theory (Roy, 2009), recent years have seen the emergence of 
a potent “Southern critique”, engaging perhaps most vociferously with Guy Standing’s (2011) idea 
of the precariat – a precarious proletariat – as a “new” and “dangerous” global class (Munck, 2013; 
Scully, 2016). This area of research draws attention to the informal, uncertain and highly contingent 
nature of work that has long characterised labour markets in the South, highlighting some of the 
ways in which “the West” now appears to be catching up with “the Rest” (Breman and Van der 
Linden, 2014), and in doing so punching major holes in the orthodox transition narratives of 
capitalist development (see Li, 2017).  
Clearly, there are some limits to these two overarching conceptualisations of precarity. 
Whereas research within the second camp has tended to suffer from a narrow focus on a certain 
form of labour insecurity, linked intrinsically to a prevailing Northern bias, writing within the 
ontological category has been accused of “flattening difference” and expansive claim-making 
(Kasmir, 2018; Neilson, 2019), leading some to argue that the concept of precarity may have 
 
1 As starkly revealed by the global COVID-19 crisis: while some politicians in the United Kingdom have 
tried to frame the virus as a “great leveller”, it is clear that the pandemic’s health and economic impacts are 
being experienced most acutely by those on the under-protected frontlines of the economy (Ebata, Mader 
and Bloom, 2020; Gore, 2020; Langford, 2020). Data published by The Guardian in May 2020, for example, 
shows that people working low-paid manual jobs are four times more likely to die from coronavirus than 
those in white-collar professional occupations (Barr and Inman, 2020). Meanwhile, in South Africa, a recent 
report indicates that the country’s gig workers have been falling through the cracks: as a result of their 
independent contractor status they are unable to access government support for either formal employees or 
small businesses, and the majority of platforms have taken no responsibility to compensate workers for lost 
income (Fairwork, 2020). 
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become “over-stretched” (Alberti et al., 2018). Is there some kind of middle ground to be found 
here? Based on our stocktake of the literature, there is. Below are three core ways in which 
“thinking with precarity” adds analytical value to the study of contemporary livelihoods and the 
changing nature of work.  
 
Labour anxieties and beyond 
A certain “economism” is said to run through the second camp, rooted in its relationship with both 
the industrial relations literature as well as the institutionalised, ILO-inflected nature of research 
into precarious employment since the 1990s (Lewis et al., 2015; Strauss, 2018; see also Rodgers and 
Rodgers, 1989). However, important efforts have been made to demonstrate that precarity is 
“something more than a position in the labour market” (Neilson and Rossiter, 2005: para. 18). 
Analysis in this vein has sought to situate the experience of contingent and intermediated labour in 
relation to “broader lifeworlds”, highlighting the “profoundly destabilizing effects” that precarious 
employment can have on wider questions of household dynamics, welfare provision, and social 
and political status (Lewis et al., 2015: 585; see also Burridge and Gill, 2016). From this perspective, 
thinking with precarity in a sense involves operating across the camp divide, focusing primarily on 
the concrete conditions of the labour market but always looking to explore the broader social and 
political implications of insecure work. 
This moves us towards a more helpful framing of precarity that i) grounds the study of work 
in concrete labour market experiences and employment relationships, while ii) also making it speak 
to processes, transformations and relationships playing out beyond the confines of the labour 
market. Such a reframing brings two advantages. First, it compels us to question the proposition 
that precarity has become an overstretched concept, too all-encompassing and subsequently too 
diluted to be of any real use to anyone. If the core focus is on understanding what is changing 
within the labour market, then that is what is to be studied. And second, it encourages us to see 
changes in the nature of work as not simply a matter of industrial relations or a mere by-product 
of technological progress, but as evidence of a shifting relationship between labour, capital and the 
state (Breman and Van der Linden, 2014; Meagher, 2018). 
According to James Ferguson and Tania Li, this constitutes “precarity’s” most significant 
contribution to contemporary analysis, “surfac[ing] a set of issues that go far beyond purely 
economic ones” (Ferguson and Li, 2018: 2). For these authors, the affective anxieties inherent to 
notions of precarity are “not just about paychecks, but equally about issues of identity, gender and 
family [and] national membership”, all of which were previously anchored by what they term the 
“social ideal of the ‘proper job’” (Ferguson and Li, 2018.: 2). Studies that share this approach have 
generated valuable insights into the multiple and variously scaled ways in which the “uncertainty 
of securing a livelihood bleeds into other aspects of life” (Han, 2018: 335), ranging from issues 
around psychological distress and stalled transitions into adulthood to an eroded sense of social 
belonging and a heightened sense of social abandonment (see Millar, 2017: 5). From this 
perspective, precarity provides a crucial conceptual stepping-stone between everyday work lives 
and a broader politics of citizenship, belonging and entitlement. As outlined above, the real grounds 
for the concept’s analytical deployment are to be found in its articulation as a “relational nexus” 
that connects “questions of political economy to matters of culture, subjectivity, and experience” 
– as opposed to either a bounded condition of labour insecurity on the one hand or broad 
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What (un)makes precarity? Engaging with process 
Contributions from labour geography, as well as other cognate fields and disciplines, make it clear 
that precarity is much more than a descriptive concept. Though it has found common usage as a 
label, employed to denote a certain kind of economic, political or social condition characterised by 
a certain kind of adversity or insecurity, it is generally accepted that the value of precarity lies in its 
emphasis on process rather than its role as an end-state signifier (Ettlinger, 2007; Strauss, 2018). In 
their recent stocktake of the literature, for example, Alberti et al. (2018) conclude that precarity 
might be better thought of or reframed as precarisation, reminding us of the need to home in on the 
grounded ways through which conditions of precarity are both made and, if not accepted, then at 
least tolerated.  
This is not about making vague references to deterministic universal forces (Lee and Kofman, 
2012; Yeung, 2019). Rather, it entails a close analysis of how particular political-economic actors, 
operating in accordance with the competitive logic of the global capitalist economy, have acted in 
relatively systematic ways to undermine labour standards around the world while normalising the 
deep insecurity that accompanies “flexible” work (Lorey, 2015; Stanford, 2017). As Jonathan Parry 
(2018: 32) succinctly puts it, “Neoliberal economies produce precarious workers”, underpinned as 
they are by a particular kind of alliance between state and capital that typically works against the 
interests of secure labour and at the service of growth and innovation at any cost (Meagher, 2018: 
12). The fact that widespread precarious work is “allowed” to even exist additionally speaks to the 
generalised consent that legitimises it within society, summed up as follows by Jim Stanford (2017: 
395-6): “Perhaps the greatest achievement of neoliberalism has been the construction of an 
attitude, common among young workers today, that they can expect nothing more from the labour 
market than an endless series of precarious ‘gigs’”. Recognising and dissecting such issues is vital 
for understanding how “hegemonic projects [such as neoliberalism] are anchored at the level of 
everyday life” (Barnett, 2005, in Yeung, 2019: 239), connected to concrete labour market 
experiences through policies, laws and informal institutions. 
Research across multiple scales is relevant here, with highly granular approaches revealing the 
grounded mechanisms through which insecure work and unstable livelihoods are actually 
produced, in both formal as well as informal spaces of the economy (Ferreira, 2016). Some recent 
examples may help to illustrate this. Drawing on ethnographic material from one of India’s oldest 
special economic zones (SEZs) in the state of Andhra Pradesh, Jamie Cross (2010: 370) shows 
how, far from constituting spaces of exception (as they are so often characterised), these zones 
simply re-create the “casual, insecure and unprotected” nature of “working life outside”. Indeed, it 
is the state-sanctioned institutionalisation of flexible and deregulated labour regimes within the zone 
that makes its operation a corporate success against the backdrop of a globalised, hyper-
competitive marketplace. A similar sort of state-led, or at least state-enabled, approach to the 
(re)production of precarious work is observed by Rebecca Prentice (2018) in the Caribbean 
garment sector, where the Trinidadian government’s enthusiastic promotion of “enterprise 
culture” has seen a “devolution of garment work from factories to workshops and workers’ homes” 
alongside an associated casualisation of employment within the sector. In this neo-liberal take on 
job creation and economic development, “insecurity becomes recast as freedom, self-exploitation 
reframed as ‘being your own boss’” (Prentice, 2018, in Parry, 2018: 9) – a move that can also be 
found in the increasingly “individualised” and empowerment-focused approach to economic 
programming taken by development agencies across a wider range of contexts (Flynn, Mader and 
Oosterom, 2016). 
Meanwhile, Madhumita Dutta’s (2019) use of life histories to examine women’s factory work 
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in southern India reveals how individual exposure to precarity is mediated not just by the 
constrained possibilities of the regional economy, but also by a more intimate set of social relations 
found “beyond” the workplace. Through in-depth accounts of the process of “becoming” factory 
workers, the study illustrates that movements towards precarious industrial employment need to 
be understood in relation to the gendered nature of entitlements within households and 
communities, as the shifts in these women’s labour “between different forms, roles and sites … 
from a very young age” emerge in response to societal expectations of responsibility and personal 
experiences of patriarchal oppression (Dutta, 2019: 12). In effect, there are regulating forces across 
multiple scales at play here – few of which emanate from formal state legislation – that shape both 
the types of work selected populations are able to access as well as the terms on which they 
participate in the labour market.  
Also relevant here is a vibrant strand of the literature that, in contrast to the above, focuses 
on what unmakes precarity. Indeed, precarious employment is neither a condition without origins 
nor a permanent state, as workers typically portrayed as anomic, fragmented and politically 
immobile pursue, from time to time, strategies of various kinds to challenge and improve the 
conditions of their work. It is often the very experience of unstable living – or, perhaps more 
specifically, the extended pursuit of precariously held-together livelihood arrangements – that 
generates a politics of resistance (Lazar and Sanchez, 2019; Smith, 2019). Seen from this angle, the 
experience of precarious labour tends to be envisaged as something shared: a cross-cutting 
characteristic of the everyday realities faced by millions of people heterogeneously “employed” in 
a wide array of sectors and activities, and the basis of an emergent class consciousness and 
subsequent political pushback; this is perhaps most sharply crystallised in the iconic figure of San 
Precario and the related European stunts of the early 2000s (see Van der Linden, 2014).  
Yet it is here that the theory occasionally strays too far from the empirics. As Clara Han (2018: 
333) argues, the “model of politics” often associated with commentaries on precarity creates 
“serious blind spots”, as its preoccupation with coherent collective action, organised social 
movements and “revolutionary fervour” elides both the quieter, less visible forms of struggle 
displayed around the world on a much more regular basis (Ballard, 2015; Bayat, 2000), as well as 
“unrulier” forms of spontaneous and direct action that may be far removed from the progressive 
and sanitised domain of civil society (Chatterjee, 2004; Khanna, 2012; Tadros, 2014; McMahon, 
2017). To some extent, therefore, the concept of precarity only finds its feet when an appropriate 
– and grounded – conception of differentiated politics is incorporated into its analytical machinery 
(see Featherstone and Korf, 2012; Li, 2019). This subject is taken up further in the next and final 
part of this section. 
 
Questioning the “standard” 
Though widespread labour precarity is often framed as both a deviation from the norm and a 
relatively novel phenomenon, conceptual approaches that are informed by longer histories and 
wider geographies convincingly unsettle this dominant construction. For many, the standard 
employment relationship emerged out of the ashes of World War 2 as Fordist modes of production, 
employment and consumption took hold. But a longer-term perspective, stretching back several 
decades prior to the unfolding of these post-war processes, suggests that a generalised situation of 
secure waged work should be considered the exception rather than the norm (Neilson and Rossiter, 
2008). For most, life under capitalism has tended to be substantially more “wageless” than 
orthodox portrayals suggest (Denning, 2010), and gig work, far from symbolising the new labour 
frontier of the twenty-first century, was already prevalent long before the rise of the standard 
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employment relationship (Stanford, 2017). It also bears noting that the kind of protected labour 
created by this previously dominant model was in practice distributed on a highly uneven basis, 
shot through with a range of exclusions concerning gender, race and nationality (Betti, 2018).  
On top of this is the wealth of Southern views and critiques to be considered, widening out 
the geographical optics to capture a different kind of “standard”. We see here that multiple forms 
of survivalist improvisation, not waged work, constitute the norm – and have long done so (Scully, 
2016) – as people “weave in and out of employment and self-employment” (Thorsen, 2013), 
pursuing livelihood strategies that may be “mobile and recombinant” (Du Toit and Neves, 2014) 
and “hustling” on a daily basis to manage insecurity (Thieme, 2018). 
Just as these Southern realities raise serious questions of the Eurocentric construction of 
precarity as the loss of waged work, so too do they challenge the (re)attainment of secure 
employment – a “return” to the norm that never was – as the ultimate objective of precariously 
employed populations. Even in sites far removed from the historical heartlands of Fordist 
production, the telos of the “proper job” has long framed the study of labour and livelihoods 
(Ferguson and Li, 2018), not only rendering popular forms of informal/nonstandard/unstable 
economic activity a residual category of analysis but also sealing off the diverse lived experiences 
and political subjectivities of those operating on the “frontlines” of precarity. Kathleen M. Millar’s 
(2014) research in Rio de Janeiro, for example, shows that economic life on the city’s poor 
peripheries is marked as much by a politics of detachment as it is a resistance to precarity. For 
garbage workers attempting to manage the “everyday emergencies” that accompany poverty – 
“normalised” destabilising events like health problems, debt and incarceration that disrupt plans 
and splinter routines – the rigidities of regular waged employment prevent “life projects” from 
being pursued and social relationships from being woven (Millar, 2014: 49). What follows is a 
rejection of, or detachment from, stable work after it has been experienced, as catadores return to the 
flexible irregularities of life on the dump. Not only does this suggest that the experience of 
conditions of precarious labour “shifts dramatically for workers in different class, cultural, and 
geopolitical contexts” (Millar, 2014: 48), but it also implies a decentring and de-valorisation of the 
capitalist wage relation (at least in this particular context).  
Along similar lines, evidence elsewhere points to the way in which certain populations 
categorised by others, including unions and labour activists, as “precarious” refuse to self-identify 
and align with such a classification (Thorkelson, 2016). There are issues at play here around both 
the derogatory connotations of what it means to be labelled with precarity, as well as the fact that, 
for many people, the experience of intermittent and volatile labour represents familiarity rather 
than withdrawn security. So too might it be understood locally in terms that are less all-consuming 
and diversionary than typically theorised, with research among young women factory workers in 
China suggesting that their precarity in these industrial spaces is seen as little more than “a stepping-
stone to becoming independent entrepreneurs” – less an unfortunate derailment of the search for 
a good life than a necessary stage of a longer-term project (Fang, 2018, in Parry, 2018: 30). 
In some of her later work, Millar (2017) sets out to develop a more “critical politics of 
precarity” (see also Neilson, 2019). At the core of this exercise is a rejection of the concept’s 
dominant normative tropes – the primacy of the wage; a narrative of loss; the privileging of shared, 
undifferentiated experience – and an accompanying effort to, as Muehlebach (2013, in Millar, 2017: 
6) puts it, “provincialize universalizing claims about precarity”. For those concerned about the 
analytical work that the concept of precarity is able to perform, this is a crucial move. By focusing 
on the concrete “textures of vulnerability” and “diverse forms of politics that are already before 
us” (Han, 2018: 341), it becomes possible to break from the “virtuous” framing of precarity as a 
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site of ethical struggle (Rajkovic, 2018) and, eventually, reach a “de-sanitised” understanding of the 
internal politics of marginal or surplus populations (Ortner, 1995) – one that is not necessarily 
moral, well-behaved, coherent or collective. Thus, to think critically with precarity is to question its 
very own taken-for-granted normative standards and conceptual origins.  
 
 
Precarity and the WDR19 
The preceding conceptual discussion suggests that thinking carefully and critically with precarity 
adds analytical value to the study of labour and livelihoods in three core ways. First, it provides a 
means through which adversity within the labour market can be understood not as a purely material 
or bounded phenomenon, but rather as something intrinsically connected to a broader range of 
non-economic anxieties and concerns. Second, it encourages grounded analysis of the specific 
mechanisms through which insecure work and unstable livelihoods are actually produced, as well 
as the key political-economic actors involved in this process – thus bringing important questions 
of scale and context into the spotlight. And third, by listening more closely to “views from the 
South”, it is possible to both decentre the so-called “standard” employment relationship from the 
optics of analysis, referring as it does to a particular kind of spatially and temporally bounded 
phenomenon, and open up alternative ways of understanding transformations in work and their 
accompanying politics. 
In this section we use those theoretical insights to frame a discussion of the WDR19’s handling 
of digital labour, which places a strongly positive emphasis on the emancipatory potential of 
disruptive technologies in the South (see Anner et al., 2019; Meagher, 2020; Raj-Reichert, Zajak 
and Helmerich, 2020). Thinking critically with precarity forces one to revisit this mainstream or 
conventional narrative (Pasquale, 2016), and to ask: beneath the glossy surface, what is it that is 
actually being created by the rise of the platform economy, and how are we to make sense of these 
supposedly new forms of work? In exploring those questions, this section is split into two parts. 
The first draws on emerging evidence from the Global South to describe some of the concrete 
realities faced by digital workers, looking at the nature of the work as well as people’s responses to 
it. Examples from both remote and location-based labour markets feature. The second integrates 
this empirical material with our earlier theoretical insights, using a precarity lens to start moving 
towards a possible “counter-narrative” of digital labour (Pasquale, 2016). 
 
Digital labour in the South: emerging evidence 
While research into the digitalisation of labour has so far concentrated mainly on higher-income 
countries in the Global North (Raj-Reichert et al., 2020), a focus on Southern experiences is slowly 
beginning to emerge. Remote platform work is one of the areas receiving attention, with recent 
research by both the Oxford Internet Institute (OII) and International Labour Organization (ILO) 
shedding much-needed light on the realities of crowdwork, micro-tasking and freelancing. 
Drawing on a large-scale global survey of 2 350 crowdworkers (approximately one-third of 
whom were based in developing countries), the ILO research shows that despite connecting distant 
individuals to new sources of income, these jobs tend to provide limited opportunities for personal 
growth, skills development and career progression (Rani and Furrer, 2019) – with the added 
possibility down the line that extended engagement in “low-end and mind-numbing” tasks may 
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end up deskilling highly educated crowdworkers (Berg et al., 2018).2 It is also estimated that for 
every hour spent doing paid work, about twenty minutes of additional time is spent searching for 
tasks (Rani and Furrer, 2018) – reflective of the unpaid waiting or down time that is characteristic 
of “dependent self-employment” (Moore and Newsome, 2018). Furthermore, the majority of 
respondents felt they had no source of protection or support for their work, despite it forming the 
sole source of income for nearly 60 per cent of the Southern sample.  
The more in-depth approach of the OII research takes us closer to the lived experience of 
remote work. A four-year, five-country qualitative study in sub-Saharan Africa finds that, in 
contrast to the mainstream developmental notions of freedom and flexibility that are 
conventionally associated with gig work, the reality entails significant degrees of precarity and 
vulnerability (Anwar and Graham, 2020; see also Wood et al., 2019a). Examining the substance or 
quality of these jobs reveals a wide range of problematic conditions and consequences, including 
loneliness and social isolation, long hours and high work intensity, non-payment of wages, fear of 
losing jobs and unfair dismissals. It is argued that the promise of freedom and flexibility is often 
accompanied by the possibility of becoming “trapped in continuous cycles of exploitation” – 
something which is particularly true for workers who are new to gig work, who come from 
disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, and who lack educational qualifications (Anwar and 
Graham, 2020: 17). 
Location-based platform work is another area receiving attention in the South. Research here 
has started to reveal some of the broader consequences of digitalisation, stretching beyond a 
preoccupation with the nature of digital employment in and of itself. Recent studies of digital ride-
hailing, for example, highlight how the “Uber-isation” of urban transport systems affects not just 
the lives and livelihoods of newly connected digital workers but also wider dynamics within (and 
even beyond) the sector, as the following examples show: new patterns of asset ownership, rent 
accumulation and extractive activity rewire the nature of local labour relations and development 
(see Carmody and Fortuin [2019] and Pollio [2019] on Cape Town); traditional or “analogue” taxi 
drivers respond in diverse ways to rising app-based competition, from subtle forms of everyday 
politics (see Turner and Hanh [2019] on Hanoi) to more explosive deployments of violence and 
intimidation (see Danielak [2019] on Johannesburg); and reciprocal networks providing a modicum 
of social security find themselves splintering under the weight of renewed labour force 
fragmentation (see Rekhviashvili and Sgibnev [2018] on Bishkek and Tbilisi; Reilly and Lozano-
Paredes [2019] on Cali). Writing in relation to Nairobi’s informal motorcycle-taxi (or boda boda) 
sector, anthropologists Ibrahim and Bize (2018: 87) propose that the emergence of ride-hailing 
apps “presents the greatest threat to the future of associational life as a source of labour solidarity”, 
as the physical and social infrastructure of the taxi stand loses relevance and the “idle time” 
previously used to build relationships slowly evaporates. This is not simply an accounting problem 
of how many traditional jobs are being displaced by technology, but a question of how the process 
of digitalisation may be reconfiguring, and in some cases unravelling, pre-existing methods of 
maintaining economic and social stability among workers (and indeed their dependents). 
As these reconfigurations take effect, what kinds of responses are we seeing from affected 
workers? Further research by the OII explores the scope and limits of collective agency among 
“online freelancers” in six sub-Saharan and south-east Asian countries (Wood, Lehdonvirta and 
Graham, 2018). Though physical connection and interaction is largely absent within the workforce 
 
2 Within the Rani and Furrer (2019) sample, university-level education was common among workers from 
Asia (80%), Latin America (58%) and Africa (47%). 
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for obvious reasons, their findings point to the construction and maintenance of digital 
relationships via forums and social media groups, which they suggest might form the basis of a 
“freelancer collective identity”. At the same time, however, the development of a truly shared sense 
of collective identity is constrained by a fragmentation of labour along national, occupational and 
platform lines. Its political character is likewise dampened by an absence of class consciousness – 
respondents rarely spoke of having a boss, tending instead to emphasise the aspirational and 
entrepreneurial nature of the work – and a generalised apathy towards unionisation. The potential 
paradox hinted at here is noted in the authors’ observation that the “perceived autonomy and 
flexibility of freelancing made it appealing, even when workers recognised that freelancing entailed 
a worsening of other labour conditions” (Wood et al., 2018: 104). 
Building on these issues around collective identity, more recent OII research has probed the 
question of collective action among remote platform workers. Tracking down “mobilised” 
individuals in a number of countries, including the Philippines, Wood and Lehdonvirta (2019) 
demonstrate that people who regard themselves as self-employed can and do engage in forms of 
collective action against the platforms, including the signing and dissemination of e-petitions and 
engaging in online dissent. Such expressions, they suggest, are rooted in the perception of a 
“distributional conflict of interest” between “themselves and the platforms which they labour 
through” (Wood and Lehdonvirta, 2019: 30), underlining a sense of discontent with the perceived 
fairness of the “deal”, as it were. Successful outcomes of these “acts of protest” rarely materialised, 
however, reflecting the difficult contexts in which attempts at “digital disruption” take place 
(Graham et al., 2017).  
Somewhat more tangible acts of resistance can be found in the location-based world of digital 
ride-hailing. Despite the presumption of atomised anonymity that tends to accompany orthodox 
visions of digital labour (Anwar and Graham, 2019), recent evidence points to a range of collective 
responses on the part of disgruntled taxi drivers. Even in parts of the Global North, where labour 
protests among the likes of Uber’s “independent contractors” have typically been expressed 
through the courts (Ofstad, 2017), more collective forms of public demonstration and strike-based 
action, facilitated by “non-traditional” unions such as the Independent Workers of Great Britain 
(IWGB), have begun to emerge. Last year, for example, saw what was “likely the largest-ever gig 
worker protest to date” take place (Glaser, 2019), as Uber and Lyft drivers across the world formed 
a digital picket line in advance of Uber’s initial public offering – a move that attracted considerable 
political attention and support. 
Though substantially less transnational in character, collective actions in certain African 
countries have taken a similar form, with driver strikes experienced in Kenya in 2017 and South 
Africa the year after in response to declining working conditions (Wamathai, 2017; Rawlins, 2018). 
So too have protests occasionally emerged among “analogue” taxi drivers in a number of African 
cities, as the controversial operating practices of gig economy platforms are seen to generate unfair 
levels of competition within the local marketplace (Meagher, 2018). In addition to these highly 
visible and at times violent acts, research suggests that expressions of collective agency also take 
place on a more low-key basis. For example, in Carmody and Fortuin’s (2019: 9) study of Cape 
Town’s Uber economy, drivers had begun to “fortify collective action through joining WhatsApp 
groups and sharing information”, representing a “stepping stone to empowerment”. Earlier 
research by Geitung (2017) highlights further instances of (attempted) collective action, including: 
crowdfunding by a drivers’ “Guild” to finance legal battles; the pursuit of meetings with Cape 
Town’s municipal bureaucracy; and the claiming of “social space” at the parking lot of the city’s 
airport. Again, the actual effectiveness of such actions is far from clear. 
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Revisiting the “changing nature of work”: towards a counter-narrative of digital labour 
Drilling down into the concrete realities of digital labour, as thinking critically with precarity 
compels one to do, reveals what the conventional WDR19 narrative for the most part obscures. 
With its narrow emphasis on the connective and generative capacities of new technology, the 
Report fails to seriously consider how changes in the nature of work may be affecting not just the 
pay cheques of newly “digitised” workers but also broader systems of labour relations, associational 
life and politics – aspects of which may be central to the maintenance of unstable-yet-vital 
livelihood arrangements. As the empirical material discussed above clearly shows, technology does 
more than create and connect. It can actively reconfigure, generating friction for both digital and 
analogue workers as well as the social worlds they inhabit. 
Emerging here is a new sort of angle on the idea of disruptive technology, no longer a purely 
supportive or connective force linking Southern informal workers to the “well-oiled machine” of 
global economic power (Tsing, 2012: 708) – in ways that are overwhelmingly beneficial and 
unproblematic – but instead representing a genuine disturbance to the basis of informal economic 
life, with (as yet) uncertain but very real effects on people’s livelihoods. What this in turn speaks to 
is a possible “counternarrative” of digital labour (Pasquale, 2016), in which calls to “Disrupt Africa” 
by “riding the wave of the digital revolution” (PWC, 2016) find themselves being weighed more 
robustly against what it truly means to disrupt precarious work/ers. 
Efforts to deal with uncertain and disrupted livelihoods often draw people into diverse kinds 
of political spaces, relations and practices at various scales (Smith, 2019). But as far as questions of 
political voice, representation and claim-making are concerned, particularly within increasingly 
informalised workforces, the WDR19 for the most part limits itself to calling for “stronger 
collective bargaining structures”. In this reading, the main barrier to expanding workers’ voices 
resides in the proposition that “the significance of such structures is declining”, citing reductions 
over the last few decades in trade union membership in high-income countries and pointing to the 
“limited role” that “unions and collective bargaining tend to play” in developing countries with 
high levels of economic informality (World Bank, 2019: 118).  
Here again, thinking critically with precarity reveals what the WDR19 obscures. Though 
unions and organised movements remain an important feature of contemporary labour politics, 
often in increasingly modified formats (Chun and Agarwala, 2016), it is crucial to recognise that 
not all responses to uncertainty and insecurity within the labour market take a standardised form. 
Evidence from a broad range of sectors and contexts shows how the expression of labour agency 
is often “multi-scaled” (Bocking, 2018), widely divergent in its visibility and amplitude (Ballard, 
2015), and channelled in ways that may be far from organised or connected to the wider workforce 
(Rogaly, 2009). In some cases, it may also take “unruly” forms of spontaneous and direct action 
that are far removed from the progressive and sanitised world of civil society (McMahon, 2017).  
These dynamics are reflected in the emerging evidence on digital labour. In contrast to popular 
claims that gig workers are anomic and essentially unorganisable, the brief cases considered here 
illustrate that possibilities for the expression of collective agency and contentious politics are to be 
found in multiple and diverse forms. In the remote world of platform labour, microtaskers and 
freelancers develop virtual communities that variously constitute a source of support, a space for 
grievance sharing and a “network of trust” (Wood et al., 2019b), alongside other low-key forms of 
everyday resilience and resistance that help make up the “hidden transcripts of the gig economy” 
(Anwar and Graham, 2019). Drivers trying to make a living in the world of digital ride-hailing 
engage in public protest as well as other variations of union-supported action; sometimes such 
techniques turn violent. Perhaps more than anything else, what these examples speak to is Li’s 
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(2019: 47) insistence that “the capacity for critical politics is permanent and broadly distributed” – 
extending far beyond the traditional structures of unionisation, regardless of whether they happen 
to be on the rise or in decline, and pulling into view diverse forms and scales of political expression. 
Variety, however, does not guarantee significance. While political activity and expression 
within the world of digital labour are both more apparent and more diverse than often assumed, 
the cases here amply illustrate the limits of (gig) worker agency. These limits cannot be explained 
simply by the diminishing influence of trade unions, as implied by the WDR19, but are instead 
produced through a combination of mechanisms that are likely to operate in contextually specific 
ways (Yeung, 2019). We have already seen, for example, how differentiation comes into play: 
distinctions within the stratified world of digital labour mean that, where they are found, solidarities 
between workers are bounded rather than universal (see Portes, 1998). Interests, characteristics and 
subjectivities tend to be particular to certain groups rather than general of a broader “class in the 
making” (Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Ettlinger, 2016; Lazar and Sanchez, 2019). Then there is 
also the matter of consent, which speaks to the normalisation of unstable, unprotected work as the 
basis for one’s livelihood – neo-liberalism’s “greatest achievement” (Stanford, 2017: 395). It is 
through the compelling construction of gig workers as autonomous entrepreneurs, alongside other 
variants of contingent and supply chain labour, that the formation of a class consciousness 
becomes further unstuck and the development of an effective politics of resistance “interrupted” 
(Tsing, 2009; Li, 2019; Smith, 2019). Traditional union-centred perspectives either eradicate or 
downplay the role of such mechanisms, leading to a misdiagnosis of the problems surrounding 
limited worker voice and restricting the search for potential practical solutions. With its emphasis 
on diversity, “non-standard” practices and the mechanics of becoming (and staying) insecure, a 




While it may be true that in some respects precarity has suffered “significant conceptual stretching” 
over time (Alberti et al., 2018: 448), applied in increasingly vague and all-encompassing ways that 
filter out contextual specificity and differentiation, this article has sought to demonstrate that 
“thinking (critically) with precarity” continues to prove a valuable and worthwhile exercise – so 
long as that thinking is carefully articulated. This involves understanding precarity as: 1) rooted in 
concrete labour market experiences but also connected to broader anxieties over social and political 
life; 2) a process-focused concept rather than end-state adjective; and 3) speaking to longer histories 
and wider geographies than its commonplace status as a residual term or category implies. Thus 
specified, seeing through a precarity lens reveals much about the Word Development Report 2019 that 
is problematic, from its overstated claims about the novelty of certain types of twenty-first-century 
work to its embrace of flexible labour market regimes – which, if anything, have long been a crucial 
mechanism in the production of precarious work. It is only by taking note of such dynamics that 
we are able to identify the precise ways in which the nature of work might be changing in some 
places (resulting in the loss of previously secure livelihoods for certain populations in the Global 
North) just as it stagnates or intensifies in others (consolidating labour informality across large 
parts of the South).  
On the particular question of technological innovation and digital labour, the WDR19 is clear 
in its assessment: disruptive technology is a force for good, and must be nurtured rather than stifled. 
Recent offerings from the International Panel on Social Progress (2018) alongside additional 
contributions from the World Bank (e.g. World Bank, 2016; Bussolo et al., 2019; Choi et al., 2019; 
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Strusani and Houngbonon, 2020) lend further grist to the mill, reinforcing the notion that rather 
than try to regulate (and, by implication, obstruct) the advances of capital, the role of states should 
instead be to equip societies with the tools necessary to adapt to the coming future of work. It is 
possible that the 2020 (and beyond?) coronavirus pandemic may be used as a pretext to push and 
entrench this narrative even further, reframing automation and wholesale digitalisation as necessary 
measures in an era of lockdowns and physical distancing. 
Thinking critically with precarity reveals an alternative perspective, taking us from an 
optimistic focus on the connective possibilities of disruptive technology towards a critical politics 
of disrupted livelihoods. Far from being deterministic or unidirectional, processes of precarisation 
and lived experiences of unstable livelihoods generate “diverse forms of politics” as well as a range 
of reactions and counterforces (Han, 2018: 341). Though these seldom amount to the kind of 
organised, revolutionary and “ethical” politics discussed so widely within the literature on precarity, 
what they demonstrate perhaps more than anything else is that society does not simply (or only) 
adapt to changes in the nature of work. Through techniques that may be structured or unstructured, 
orderly or unruly, legible or otherwise, workers have been repeatedly shown to contest and negotiate 
the machinations of capital (Anner et al., 2019). Whether such responses actually produce better 
livelihoods is, of course, an open question. But the fact they exist at all suggests that the integration 
of new technologies of employment into local economic settings may be far less seamless – or 
perhaps, to borrow the recent phrasing of Eric Sheppard (2019), far more “raggedy” – than the 
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